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1. Introduction 
 
The  consequences  of  economic  development  on  fertility  dynamics  have  given  rise  to 
controversial but often negated predictions. An example of this is the pioneering thesis of 
Malthus, who anticipated rapid growth in population size going hand in hand with economic 
development.  While  Malthus  predicts  a  pro-cyclical  evolution  of  fertility,  the  demographic 
transition theory (DTT) suggests that in countries that develop from a pre-industrial to an 
industrialised  economic  system,  long-term  increases  in  economic  wealth  and  income  per 
capita are combined with a transition from high to low birth and death rates (Galor and Weil 
1999; Doepke 2009). The DTT predicts ever-decreasing fertility rates with economic growth. 
Indeed,  in  many  OECD  countries  over  recent  decades,  a  rapid  decline  of  fertility  below 
replacement level was observed that went hand in hand with economic growth. However, in 
the last few years, especially in highly developed countries, fertility trends have reversed 
simultaneously with continuing economic development. 
 
Whether further economic advancement is likely to provoke a revival of fertility in highly 
developed  countries  is  of  major  political,  social  and  economic  interest.  As  fertility  affects 
population  growth  and  the  age  structure  of  the  population,  changes  in  fertility  in  the 
immediate future have far-reaching consequences on economic development, productivity 
growth and aspects of welfare systems (Barro and Becker 1989; Prskawetz and Lindh 2006; 
Prskawetz et al. 2008). Fertility response to economic development is not similar in nature at 
all  points.  Many  factors  shape  the  relationship,  over  and  above  the  economic  dimension 
(Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988). 
 
Yet  a  series  of  empirical  studies  have  identified  changing  relationships  between 
economic growth and fertility rates. Butz and Ward (1979), for example, find that whereas in 
the USA fertility trends were pro-cyclical before 1960, they turned counter-cyclical from the 
1960s until the late 1970s. Most recently, Myrskylä, Kohler and Billari (2009) find a so-called 
“inverse  J-shaped”  relationship  between  the  human  development  index  (HDI)  and  total 
fertility rates, suggesting a fertility rebound from a certain level of human development on. 
However, the use of a composite measurement of human development masks the particular 
contributions of each of the indicator’s components (GDP per capita, life expectancy and 
school enrolment). In addition, Myrskylä et al. (2009) do not provide an estimation model that 
allows empirically estimating in one step the exact level of HDI leading to a reversal of the 
fertility trend. Hence, the empirical studies do not make it possible to conclude whether in 
OECD countries, further economic growth can be expected to go hand in hand with a fertility 
increase.  
 
In order to find out whether economic development is the driving factor behind the fertility 
rebound observed in several highly developed OECD countries, we focus our analysis on the 
impact of income per capita alone on fertility. On the basis of theoretical arguments, recent 
empirical findings and descriptive statistics, we pose the hypothesis of a convex impact of 
GDP per capita on fertility, implying an inverse J-shaped pattern of fertility along the process 
of economic development (i.e. a U-shaped pattern with the declining branch on the left hand 
side longer than the rising branch at the right-hand side). We empirically test our hypothesis 
using  data  for  OECD  countries  that  spans  the  years  1960  to  2007.  As  GDP  per  capita 
captures more than one dimension of economic advancement, we filter out the impact of its 
various components (labour productivity, average working hours, employment) on fertility, 
and we also take account of their gender distribution.  
 
The main novelty of our contribution is that we propose a one-step estimation model, 
which can be used to quantify a clear turning point in the relationship between economic 
development and fertility, at which further economic advancement can be expected to lead to 
a rebound of fertility. Moreover, we separately identify within-country trends and between-  5 
country  variations  in  order  to  capture  within-country  trends  as  precisely  as  possible, 
controlling for cross-country differences that can shift the relationship one way or the other. A 
range  of  econometric  techniques  are  used  to  control  for  omitted  variable  bias,  non-
stationarity and endogeneity.  Furthermore, in addition to standard periodic fertility rates, we 
use tempo-adjusted fertility rates in order to control for changes in the timing of births. We 
also  test  the  robustness  of  our  findings  by  controlling  for  different  income  distribution 
patterns. We find that economic development is likely to induce a fertility rebound, but is not 
sufficient to lift fertility to a significantly higher level in all OECD countries. By dividing GDP 
per  capita  into  components,  we  identify  an  increase  in  female  employment  as  a  main 
correlate with the rebound of fertility to replacement level that has recently taken place in 
some OECD countries. The possibility of combining work with family formation thus emerges 
as a key parameter explaining variations in fertility trends. 
 
Our interpretation of these results is the following: A qualitative change in the content of 
economic  growth  alters  the  nature  of  its  influence  on  fertility  rates.  The  change  occurs 
because fertility and economic development are linked in a two-way relationship. On the one 
hand, changes in population composition, which are caused by fertility variations, affect the 
propensity of women to work. Furthermore, the population composition affects a country’s 
level of investments in education as well as the propagation of innovation and technologies, 
which  shape  productivity.  By  this  means,  fertility  affects  the  long-term  path  of  economic 
growth. On the other hand, economic growth affects fertility. However, whether economic 
growth  increases  or  decreases  fertility  depends  on  a  country’s  development  stage. 
Consequently, the impact of economic development on fertility can change its sign at various 
points in the process of economic development. We show that in economically advanced 
countries, the impact of economic development on fertility has changed from negative to 
positive. Furthermore, we find that female employment, which is a key dimension of GDP, is 
a  driving  factor  for  this  change,  as  the  revival  of  fertility  goes  hand  in  hand  with  the 
development of female employment. Our finding suggests that the change in the impact of 
economic  development  on  fertility  reflects  new  patterns  of  fertility  behaviour,  in  which 
childbearing goes together with female labour market participation. 
 
Section  2  presents  an  overview  of  the  existing  theoretical  literature  on  the  two-way 
interactions between economic development and fertility. The following empirical sections 
focus  on  the  impact  of  economic  development  on  fertility.  In  Section  3,  we  present  the 
existing empirical findings on the impact of macroeconomic outcomes on fertility. Section 4 
contains  a  discussion  of  our  data.  Section  5  presents  our  empirical  strategy  and  the 
estimation results. Section 6 concludes by summarising the main findings and identifying 
directions for future research. 
 
 
2. Economic development and fertility: the chicken or the 
egg? 
 
Macroeconomic  outcomes  and  fertility  variations  are  highly  interconnected.  A  general 
theoretical  approach  throwing  light  on  this  interconnection  is  given  by  Barro  and  Becker 
(1989), who, among other things, put forward the co-determination of fertility and economic 
growth paths. Further theoretical developments have clearly extended the idea of a two-way 
relationship  between  fertility  behaviour  and  economic  advancement.  However,  the 
arguments in the literature concerning the impact of economic advancement on fertility are 
ambivalent.  At  the  same  time,  there  are  many  ways  in  which  fertility  inversely  impacts 
economic outcomes, and theory also shows ambivalent results for this direction of effect.  
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The two-way relationship between population growth and economic development makes 
it difficult to designate a clear impact of one variable on the other. To keep track of the 
possible effects of economic outcomes on population growth, it is necessary to consider also 
the inverse effects of economic development on population growth. This applies no less to 
empirical  investigation  than  to  theoretical  analysis,  which  is  why,  before  presenting  the 
theoretical  literature  on  the  impact  of  economic  development  on  fertility,  we  first  present 
some main arguments on how fertility impacts economic outcomes.  
 
 
2.1. The impact of fertility on economic outcomes  
 
Neoclassical growth models suggest a negative impact of fertility on economic outcomes, 
while more recent endogenous growth models rather argue in favour of a positive impact. 
Based on the Malthusian “population trap” argument, according to which fertility increases 
lead  to  poverty  and  pauperisation  due  to the finite  nature  of  natural  resources,    Solow’s 
(1956)  “exogenous”  growth  model  predicts  that  population  growth  leads  to  a  “dilution”  of 
physical capital, on the assumption that the supply of capital is fixed and returns of labour are 
diminishing.  Intergenerational  models  assume  that  a  reduction  in  family  size  increases 
private  savings  and  enables  households  to  invest  more  in  each  of  their  children,  which 
makes the labour force more productive and thus enhances growth (Galor and Weil 1996, 
1999, 2000; De la Croix and Doepke 2003; Doepke 2004; Galor 2005). In addition, reduced 
fertility enables women to participate in the labour force, which is beneficial for a country’s 
labour force and increases investments in children and thus is positive for economic growth 
(Klasen 1999; Knowles et al. 2002; Klasen and Lamanna 2009; Bloom et al. 2009). Another 
stream of arguments relates to the “demographic dividend” by emphasising that declining 
fertility rates imply decreasing youth dependency rates and thus a relative increase in the 
share of working age people in a population, which in turn increases output per capita and 
thereby per capita income (Bloom et al. 2003; Bloom et al. 2010).  
 
However, in the middle and long run, decreasing young cohorts lead to a reduction of the 
working age population and thereby to a reduction of a country’s labour force as well as an 
increase in old-age dependency rates. Consequently, the long-term impact of a decrease in 
fertility on economic growth may rather be negative (Lindh and Malmberg 1996; Beaudry and 
Green 2000; Prskawetz and Lindh 2006). In the same line, main elements in the endogenous 
growth theory speak in favour of a positive impact of fertility on economic development. By 
defining  human  capital,  innovations  and  technical  advancement  as  a  key  element  of 
economic  growth,  endogenous  growth  models  emphasise  the  importance  of  population 
growth, as population growth increases the number of workers available to the economy and 
therefore  its  “talent  pool”.  Moreover,  population  density  boosts  innovations,  technology 
transfer  and  knowledge  exchange  which  stimulate  productivity  and  thus  income  growth 
(Arrow 1962; Boserup 1965, 1970; Phelps 1966; Lucas 1988; Simon1981, 1986). Following 
this logic, an ageing population risks decreasing labour productivity and growth by slowing 
down the motor for technical innovations, which are driven mainly by younger generations
1. 
Furthermore, high old-age dependency ratios increase health and pension expenditures at 
the expense of investments in education, research and development (Blanchet 2002).  
 
 
                                                 
1 The empirical evidence of declining productivity with an ageing population is limited, however. Some studies even point to a 
quite opposite conclusion, showing that older, more experienced workforces can increase productivity (Malmberg et al, 2008; 
Prskawetz et al. 2008).   7 
 
2.2. The impact of economic development on fertility 
 
In developed countries, the impact of economic development on fertility is ambivalent.  
The relationship between the two variables can be divided into three different periods since 
World War II. The first period is clearly marked by a co-increase in income levels and fertility 
rates, reflecting pro-cyclical variations of fertility. Then, fertility rates shifted downwards from 
the late 1960s or early 1970s onwards, while average income levels, as measured by GDP 
per  capita,  continued  to  increase  (disregarding  short-term  fluctuations).  Early  observers, 
such as Butz and Ward (1980), argued for an emergence of contra-cyclical fertility going 
hand in hand with an increase in female employment. This does not accommodate, however, 
the recent reversal of fertility rates, which was first observed in a very limited number of 
countries until the early 2000s, but has since covered a growing number of countries. Some 
scholars have argued that this fertility “rebound” reflects a transition towards new patterns of 
family formation in which childbirths are postponed more than some decades ago. According 
to this argument, the upswing of fertility rates illustrates the end of the transition period during 
which childbirth has been postponed, whereas the total numbers of children a women has on 
average has not decreased (Goldstein et al. 2009). 
 
The new patterns of fertility are marked by an end of postponement of childbirth, new 
economic and social dimensions and modern attitudes and norms towards the family, female 
education and gender roles. The contribution of economic development to this process is still 
unclear, however. The variations in fertility outcomes over the last three or four decades 
raise two main questions about their connections with economic development, beyond short-
term fluctuations: To what extent are fertility variations connected with the trends in economic 
development?  Which  specific  dimensions  of  economic  outcomes  are  responsible  for  the 
recent upswing of fertility rates?  
 
The  impact  of  economic  growth  on fertility  is  ambivalent  in  theory,  as  an  increase  in 
income  per  capita  can  either  bring  an  increase  in  the  demand  for  children  because  the 
explicit  costs  are  more  easily  borne  (“income  effect”)  or  a  decrease  in  the  demand  for 
children.  To  explain  the  negative  impact  of  income  on  fertility,  the  main  arguments  are 
provided  by  the  so-called  “new  home  economic  theory”.  Becker  (1960,  1981)  interprets 
fertility reduction as a rational behaviour of individuals by explaining that the impact of an 
increase in individual income on fertility is subject to a quality-quantity trade-off.  A household 
income increase raises not only the indirect but also the direct costs of children, because in 
modern societies parents place more focus on children’s “quality” to raise the chances of 
their children, which induces a substitution effect against the number of children in favour of 
the “quality” per child (education) and the living standards of the household (Becker and 
Lewis 1973; Willis 1973; Cigno 1991). Another argument in favour of a negative impact of 
economic development stresses the rise in the “opportunity costs” of children derived from 
the increase in  women’s educational achievement and participation in  the labour market. 
Given the increase of the earning potential associated with higher educational attainment, 
women are encouraged to invest more time in labour market participation than in caring for 
children. A consequence is that  women most probably substitute work for children.  The 
development  of  women’s  employment  then  becomes  one  of  the  most  prominent  factors 
explaining  fertility  decrease  over  the  recent  decades  (Mincer  1963;  Becker  1965;  Willis 
1973). Substitution may dominate over the income effect when household income is limited 
and highly dependent on women’s earnings, with a decrease in fertility as a consequence. 
The  domination  of  a  substitution  effect  is  even  higher  when  the  induced  increase  in 
household income is invested in the “quality” of children rather than in their “quantity”, which 
is likely to happen when households’ income increases (Willis 1973; Cigno 1991). The two 
arguments – the focus on child quality and an increase in the opportunity cost combined, are 
economic factors which strongly contributed to the sharp decrease in fertility rates observed 
since the early 1970s when income was constantly increasing (Hotz et al. 1997).   8 
 
In addition, the increase in women’s education has been found to impact the timing of 
births but not necessarily the probability of having children. Blossfeld (1995) finds that the 
postponement  of  the  first  childbirth  is  largely  (if  not  entirely)  explained  by  the  longer 
enrolment of women in the educational system, but does not always reduce the “demand” for 
the total number of children. Consequently, increased education and employment for women 
leads to a postponement of childbirth (tempo effect), but does not necessarily affect the total 
number of children a woman has (quantum effect) (Rindfuss et al. 1980; Lesthaeghe 2001; 
Bongaarts 2002). This implies that, once the process of postponement of childbirth has come 
to an end, total fertility rates are likely to increase again (Goldstein, Sobotka and Jasilioniene 
2009). 
 
However, the impact of economic development on fertility may alter over time, for two 
main sets of reasons. First, the focus on child quality may dominate the “quantity” effect of 
income on fertility only up to a certain threshold of wealth, after which households can afford 
to have additional children without any erosion in their living standards – if the lack of income 
was  an  obstacle  to  the  completion  of  desired  fertility.  A  dominant  income  effect  may  be 
expected if economic development proves to increase the disposable income of households. 
The relative importance of this income effect is likely to be higher after a certain stage of 
development is attained, when family size is relatively  low or  when the number of hours 
supplied by women for paid work is already quite large (Hotz et al. 1997). However, positive 
long-term trends in economic growth do not necessarily preclude a rise of unemployment, 
which is known to impact negatively on fertility rates (Adsera 2004; Sobotka et al. 2010).  
 
Second,  macro-level  contexts  shape  how  economic  development  impacts  fertility 
behaviour (Lesthaeghe and Surkin 1988; Philipov et al. 2009). Since they change over time, 
the incidence of economic development of fertility trends may also vary. Changes in norms 
regarding  the  transition  to  adulthood,  partnership  formation  and  parenthood,  which 
accompany  economic  development,  also  shape  the  incidence  the  latter  may  have  on 
childbearing  decisions  (Lesthaeghe  2010;  Liefbroer  and  Merz  2010).  In  some  Western 
countries,  these  changes  are  characterised  by  an  increasing  tolerance  for  extramarital 
childbearing and for the career development of both sexes. This increasing tolerance may 
contribute to the fact that in some countries, women feel more encouraged to work and have 
children at the same time than in other countries. By providing more flexibility for childbearing 
decisions, increasing childcare opportunities and modern norms are likely to increase the 
probability that economic growth has a positive impact on fertility. In contrast, the positive 
impact  may  be  reduced  in  countries  with  insufficient  childcare  services  and  rigid  gender 
norms. Changing attitudes towards sexuality and the spread of contraception have been key 
components  in  this  “postponement”  process  as  they  give  couples  wider  opportunities  to 
control  not  only  the  number  of  their  children,  but  also  the  timing  of  births.  In  all,  these 
changes to some extent reflect the fact that societies have progressively moved towards 
norms of family size which are less binding that those applying several decades ago. Clearly 
these norms do not directly affect the cost of children, but they impact the importance this 
cost may have on childbearing decisions. 
 
The development of female employment is also crucial in this process, since it impacts 
the direct and opportunity costs of raising children. The expansion of female employment is, 
furthermore, critically dependent on the process of economic development. Different phases 
have been broadly outlined in the literature, which suggests a convex relationship between 
economic  growth  and  female  employment  rates  (Goldin  1994;  Cagatay  and  Özler  1995; 
Mammen and Paxson 2000; Luci 2009). A first period of women’s decreasing labour market 
participation can be associated with economic development on a relatively low development 
stage  if  growth  is  primarily  driven  by  improvements  in  men’s  opportunities  without 
corresponding improvements in women’s career potential. Boserup (1970) argued that such 
a  process  is  highly  likely  in  the  early  stages  of  industrialisation  and  urbanisation,  which   9 
involve a growing demand for labour mobility that weakens family networks and therefore 
reduces  the  opportunities  for  combining  work  and  family.  In  this  context,  women  either 
restrain their participation in the labour market or limit their number of children. A second 
period  is  expected  to  emerge,  however,  on  higher  development  levels  when  economic 
growth generates more opportunities for women to achieve education and participate in the 
labour  force.  Policies  accompanying  economic  development  to  facilitate  the  combination 
between  work  and family  may  also  accelerate  this  process. The  conflict  between  female 
employment and family formation may also be reduced in that case if sufficient support is 
provided  to  working  parents.  Changes  in  norms  concerning  childcare  and  work  are  also 
expected to deeply alter the conflict between female employment and childbearing. On the 
one hand, childbirths can be postponed until a period of life when they are less damaging to 
the career opportunities of women. Increasing use of contraceptives, and changes in the 
norms  concerning  childbearing  age  are  also  clearly  parameters  that  allow  households  to 
more freely decide on the timing of births. On the other hand, changing attitudes towards 
female  employment  and  the  care  of  young  children  also  facilitate  the  adaptation  of 
childbearing behaviours. These variations of contexts, which go with economic development, 
are thus highly likely to increase women’s opportunities for combining work and childbearing. 
Simultaneous  increases  in  female  labour  market  participation  and  fertility  rates  can  be 
expected in this case. 
 
Following the arguments listed above, the influence of economic growth on fertility  is 
likely to change over time, as long as the process of growth is maintained. In a context of low 
average income and high fertility, it is highly likely that an increase in average income may, in 
a first period, negatively impact fertility when economic growth takes place in a context of low 
average income combined  with a high value placed on children’s human capital and the 
development of female employment. Economic growth induces higher productivity and thus 
higher  wages,  which  may  first  encourage  households  to  invest  more  time  in  work  and 
postpone childbearing. This may, however, occur up to the point after which households may 
use their additional resources to realise their fertility plans rather than further increase their 
labour supply. A second stage may appear, however, as national income continues to grow. 
In that stage, higher income may nonetheless help households to have children when they 
want,  but  the  adaptation  of  norms  and  institutional  context  that  accompany  economic 
development and the increase in female labour market participation may also facilitate the 
realisation of fertility plans. Childbearing may be relatively postponed in this period compared 
to the first one. This non-monotonic influence of economic growth may be captured by a 
rebound in fertility rates coming after a decrease. In other words, the impact of an increase in 
GDP per capita on fertility rates may vary with the countries’ development stages. One issue 
then is to investigate whether a change from negative to positive in the influence of economic 
wealth on fertility trends can be identified in order to explain the recent fertility rebound.  
 
A  clear  empirical  strategy  can  be  derived  from  these  developments.  First,  we  aim  at 
empirically  testing  the  anticipated  inverse  J-shaped  impact  of  economic  development,  as 
captured by GDP per capita, on fertility. A clear distinction between within-country variation 
and  between-country  differences  is  required  to  figure  out  how  exactly  the  relationship 
between the two variables develops over time. Then, a second step consists in opening the 
“GDP black box” to assess which components of economic development are most related to 
fertility trends. Are fertility trends primarily driven by the development of income generated by 
work, the time constraints derived from working hours or the increase in female employment? 
Moreover, we attempt to capture which of the GDP components have been responsible for 
the increase in fertility rates observed over the most recent years in many OECD countries. 
Changes in labour productivity, employment rates and working hour patterns as well as their 
gender distribution will be scrutinised to identify the main “drivers” of the fertility rebound.  
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3. Previous empirical findings on the impact of economic 
development on fertility 
 
The existence of divergent relations between economic growth and fertility rates are also 
assessed empirically. Butz and Ward (1979) observe that fertility rates in the US were pro-
cyclical until the 1960s, but started to decline in a period of persistent economic growth from 
the 1960s until the late 1970s, implying an inverse J-shaped pattern of fertility along the 
process of economic development. In the same way, An and Seung-Hoon (2006) find an 
inverse  J-shaped  relationship  between  demographic  and  economic  growth  in  25  OECD 
countries for the years 1960 to 2000.  
 
The study by Butz and Ward (1979) has been challenged, however, for several reasons. 
While some studies such as Mocan (1990) still provide figures of persistent counter-cyclical 
fertility patterns, other studies raise objections to the empirical strategy pursued by Butz and 
Ward (1979) and propose different estimates that do not confirm the negative impact of real 
wages and income on fertility rates at higher levels of income (McDonald 1983; Krämer and 
Neusser  1984;  Macunovich  1995).  Moreover,  Butz  and  Ward’s  (1979)  prediction  of 
continuous  fertility  decline  with  further  economic  advancement  only  applies  to  a  limited 
number of countries. In many highly developed countries, a reversal of fertility trends has 
been occurring in the last decade and a rebound of fertility rates back to replacement levels 
can  be  observed  simultaneously  with  continuous  economic  growth  and  a  continuous 
increase in women’s labour market participation. In many European countries, the negative 
relationship  between  fertility  and  economic  advancement  has  weakened  within  the  last 
decade even if fertility decisions still conflict with female labour supply and an expansion of 
family-friendly policies would be necessary to further enhance fertility and women’s labour 
supply (Ahn and Mira 2002; Kögel 2004; D’Addio and Mira d’Ercole 2005).  
 
Most  recently,  Myrskylä,  Kohler  and  Billari  (2009)  argue  that  a  fundamental  change 
occurred during the last quarter of the last century in the relationship between fertility and 
human development. On the basis of both cross-sectional and longitudinal data covering 
more than 100 countries for the years 1975 to 2005, Myrskylä et al. (2009) estimate the 
impact of human development (measured by the United Nations Human Development Index: 
HDI) on total fertility rates. They use a graphical analysis to identify the potential level of HDI 
that turns the correlation between human development and fertility from negative to positive 
(HDI=0,85-0,9). This critical level is then tested by including it as a parameter in a maximum 
likelihood  function.  For  the  year  1975,  Myrskylä  et  al.  (2009)  find  a  strictly  negative 
correlation  between  HDI  and fertility  for  all  countries.  Yet, for the  year  2005, they find  a 
negative correlation between HDI and total fertility rates only for countries with a HDI level 
below that minimum. For countries with a HDI level above that minimum, Myrskylä et al. 
(2009)  find  that  the  two  variables  are  positively  correlated.  This  suggests  that  in  highly 
developed  countries  like  the  USA,  Norway  and  Ireland,  human  development  implies  a 
rebound of fertility, whereas at low and medium development levels, human development 
continues to decrease fertility. 
 
Furuoka (2009) provides a further empirical test of the critical level of HDI that leads to a 
turn  in  the  relationship.  The  test  for  the  threshold  effect  of  HDI  on  fertility  constructs 
asymptotic  confidence  intervals  for  the  threshold  parameter.  Like  Myrskylä  et  al.  (2009), 
Furuoka (2009) splits the sample in two regimes in order to test linear correlations. Furuoka 
(2009) contests the study by Myrskylä et al. (2009) by finding that in countries with a high 
Human Development Index, higher levels of HDI still tend, albeit weakly, to be associated 
with lower fertility rates.  
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Besides  ambiguous  findings,  both  Myrskylä  et  al.  (2009)  and  Furuoka  (2009)  do  not 
provide a “one step” estimation model that avoids dividing the data set into two subsamples. 
Moreover, both studies use a composite measure of human development, containing GDP 
per capita, life expectancy and school enrolment. The combination of the three components 
makes it difficult to interpret the estimated coefficients for two reasons. Firstly, due to limited 
HDI-data availability, in both studies the analysis of the fertility rebound is focused on cross-
country variations only. Secondly, it is unclear which of the HDI components initiates the 
fertility  rebound.  In  addition,  as  life  expectancy  and  school  enrolment are  correlated  with 
GDP per capita, interpretation problems arise because of multi-collinearity.   
 
 
4. Data discussion 
 
In order to identify the driving factors of the fertility rebound, we consider it appropriate to 
focus the analysis on OECD countries only, as the rebound is mainly observable in highly 
developed  countries.  A closer  look  at  the  separate  HDI  components for  OECD  countries 
shows that for this limited group of countries, the variation is greatest for GDP per capita in 
comparison  with  life  expectancy  and  school  enrolment.  This  suggests  that  in  OECD 
countries, changes of GDP per capita are more important for fertility variations than changes 
in life expectancy or school enrolment.  We therefore suggest that in OECD countries, GDP 
per  capita  is  the  driving  factor  behind  the  fertility  rebound.  To  test  our  hypothesis,  we 
propose an empirical analysis that isolates the impact of GDP per capita on fertility rates in 
OECD countries. However, we control for a set of other variables including education. We 
use a large macroeconomic panel data set that includes observations from all 30 OECD 
countries over four decades (1960-2007). 
 
The table in Appendix 1 provides an overview of all data used in this study including the 
control variables and the decomposition variables.  
 
 
4.1. Trends in total fertility rates in OECD countries 
 
The total fertility rate (TFR) by year and country is undoubtedly the most popular indicator 
used to compare fertility trends between countries. This period rate corresponds to the ratio 
between  the  number  of  births  in  a  given  year  and  the  average  number  of  women  of 
reproductive  age  (generally  considered  from  age  15  to  49)  and  thereby  represents  the 
average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if she were to 
experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates through her lifetime, and if she were to 
survive from birth to the end of her reproductive life
2. 
 
The  TFR  only  gives  an  accurate  estimation  of  completed  fertility  level  if  there  is  no 
change in the timing of births across cohorts. In the opposite case, such as when there is an 
increase in the mean age of mothers at childbirth, the number of births in a given period is 
reduced. Consequently, the postponement of birth to older ages reduces total fertility rates. 
Hence,  the  TFR  is  sensitive  to  changes  in  the  timing  of  childbirth.  However,  if  the  total 
number of children born by women over their life course does not change, total fertility rates 
increase again when postponement comes to an end at a certain age of mothers.  
 
                                                 
2 Total fertility rate is preferred to the crude birth rate, which is the ratio between the number of births in a given year and the 
number of persons of a population of the same year, because this measure is influenced by the age structure of a population. 
The total fertility rate relates births to the age-sex group at risk of giving births (women aged 15-49 years) and therefore is a 
more refined measure for comparing fertility across populations.   12 
  The dominant feature regarding fertility trends is the sharp decline in total fertility 
rates (TFR) in OECD countries over the last four decades. Looking back to the early 1970s, 
the fall appears substantial with an average TFR that fell from 3.23 children per woman in 
1970  to  1.71  in  2008,  e.g.  a  level  well  below  the  2.1  threshold  required  to  replace  the 
population  with  no  contribution from  immigration  (Figure  1  Panel  1). In 2008,  only  a few 
countries had a fertility rate around or above the so-called replacement rate level (United 
States, Ireland, New Zealand, Iceland, and Mexico and Turkey). 
 
Figure 1: Fertility trends in OECD countries 
 
Panel 1: Total fertility rates in 1960 and 2008         Panel 2: Relative change 1980-1995, 1995-2008 
           































































1980to 1995 1995to 2008 (1)
 
Source: OECD Family database 
Year 2007 for Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia. 
   
The  intensity  of  fertility  decline  varies  across  countries,  however.  It  has  been 
comparatively limited in countries where fertility rates still currently score above 1.8, namely 
in Scandinavian and English-speaking countries (except Canada) and in a few Continental 
European countries (Belgium and France). The fertility rate is above the replacement level in 
only two of this set of countries in 2008: Iceland and Ireland. Yet fertility is also slightly above 
the  population  replacement  rate  in  Mexico  and  Turkey  where  the  decrease  has  been 
extremely steep since the early 1980s, but from a much higher initial level (TFR respectively 
around 7 and 6 in the 1960s).  
A sharp decline in fertility is also observed in Korea and Japan, and in many European 
countries where fertility rates are currently far below 1.5 children per woman. Korea exhibits 
the lowest rate at around 1.2. Other “lowest-low” fertility countries, e.g. with TFR below or 
around  1.3  on  average  since  2000,  include  Austria,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Greece, 
Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain and Switzerland. In 2008, the lowest low-
fertility countries (TFR below 1.4) were Poland, Germany, Japan, Portugal, Hungary, Slovak   13 
Republic and not least Korea. The extremely low level of fertility in these countries is of great 
political concern since the population will shrink rapidly if fertility remains at such a level. 
 
      Despite  this  overall  decline  in  fertility,  many  countries  have  recently  experienced  a 
reversal of trends, with an increase in fertility rates (Figure 1 Panel 2). The “rebound” has 
been  especially  high  (above  0.3  children  per  women,  comparing  TFR  in  2008  with  the 
minimum since 1970) in Denmark, Sweden, Czech Republic, United States, Finland, France, 
United Kingdom, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, Norway and New Zealand. The timing and 
pace of this change varies from country to country. Only a few countries experienced such a 
reversal in trends in the mid-1990s (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and 
the US), while a significant increase (by above 0.2 children per woman) has occurred since 
2000  in  Sweden,  Czech  Republic,  United  Kingdom,  Greece,  Spain,  New  Zealand  and 
Ireland).  Nevertheless,  most  OECD  countries  have  seen  such  an  increase  since  2000, 
though  often  very  slight,  the  only  exceptions  being  Germany,  Korea,  Mexico,  Portugal, 
Switzerland, and Turkey. Fertility rates continue to decline in this latter set of countries, but 
the  pace  of  decrease  slowed  down.  Though  there  is  no guarantee that  these trends  will 
persist in the long run or that they reflect more than a change in the timing of childbirths. 
Alternative measurements of fertility aiming at adjusting TFR to filter out the impact of 
changes in the timing of births will also be used in the following analysis. While there is really 
no  optimal  measure  to  capture  postponement,  the  Bongaarts-Freeney  tempo-adjusted 
fertility rates (adjTFR) have become the most common indicator (Bongaarts and Feeney, 
1988; Sobotka, 2004). By weighting TFR by changes in women’s mean age at childbirth, this 
adjusted measurement focuses on the quantum-component of fertility changes. However, 
adjTFR only corresponds to a pure quantum measure of fertility on the assumption of uniform 
postponement of all stages, i.e. an absence of cohort effects (Kohler and Philipov, 2001). 
Consequently, adjTFR implies only an imperfect control for tempo effects. Moreover, tempo-
adjusted fertility rates are only available for a subset of OECD countries. We therefore start 
our empirical estimations based on total fertility rates as endogenous variable and introduce 
adjTFR only at the second stage. 
 
 
4.2. Trends in GDP per capita in OECD countries 
 
GDP per capita is measured at purchasing power parity (PPP) in constant 2005 US $. On 
average in all 30 OECD countries, GDP per capita at PPP increased from $11,915 in 1970 to 
$28,134 in 2007. Constant-price measures of GDP are considered here in order to filter out 
the increase in GDP per capita that is due to price inflation without relating to any increase in 
the consumption basket. 
 
In all countries, the increase is more or less continuous with common breaks around 
1975, 1980, 1990 and 2000 due to economic shocks that affected all countries at about the 
same time.  
 
The highest GDP per capita level can be observed in Luxembourg for the year 2007 
($65,000 at PPP; figure 2). Luxembourg’s GDP per capita level has significantly outstripped 
the GDP levels of the other observed countries since the early 1990s. Countries with high 
GDP  levels  somewhat  closer  to  the  average  level  are  Norway,  the  United  States  and 
Sweden, with highest levels in the decade after 2000. The lowest levels of GDP per capita 
can be observed in Korea, Turkey and Mexico in the 1970s, followed at some distance by 
Poland in the 1990s and Portugal in the 1970s.  
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Figure 2: Trends in GDP per capita in OECD countries 
US$, PPP constant prices (2005 reference) 
 
Panel 1: GDP values in 1970 and 2007          Panel 2: Variations compared to 1995 
 

































































1980to 1995 1995to 2007 (1)
 
Source: OECD Data Base (2009) 
 
 
       The  descriptive  analysis  suggests  that  whereas  until  the  late  1980s  in  all  observed 
countries economic advancement went hand in hand with fertility decline, since the early 
1990s the picture is threefold: generally speaking, countries with the lowest income levels 
record  continuously  declining  fertility  rates.  Countries  with  medium  income  levels  record 
stagnant fertility levels below replacement levels and countries with the highest income levels 
record a fertility rebound. This observation supports the hypothesis of an inverse J-shaped 
pattern of fertility along the process of economic development and suggests a convex impact 
of economic advancement on fertility. 
 
      In order to see whether the inverse J-shaped pattern can be observed graphically, we 
plot the observations of GDP per capita against those of total fertility (figure 3). For this data 
plot, we drop out some countries that risk over-accentuating the inverse J-shaped pattern. 
This concerns Luxembourg, which has an outstandingly high level of GDP per capita among 
OECD countries, especially in the 2000s. This also concerns Korea, Mexico and Turkey, as 
these emerging countries have outstandingly low levels of GDP per capita and high levels of 
fertility, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. However, parts of our regression analysis are 
based on the whole data set including emerging countries and early time periods from the 
1960 on. These relatively heterogeneous data allow us to capture not only effects of GDP 
per  capita  on  fertility  which  are  due  to  changes  in  individual  income  (income  effect, 
substitution effect), but also to capture development effects (reduction of fertility from very 
high levels of fertility on due to structural change).  
 
  Even without these countries, the data plot suggests a rather inverse J-shaped pattern of 
fertility along the economic development path, indicating that at low income levels, economic 
growth  lowers  fertility  whereas  form  a  certain  higher  level  of  income  on,  income  growth 
increases fertility. The data plot also suggests that the negative relationship between fertility   15 
and economic development is rather dominated by observations of the 1960s, 1970s and 




















Source: OECD Data Base (2009) 
 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
 
Our empirical procedure aims at verifying whether in OECD countries, there is a reversal 
of the correlation between fertility and economic advancement after a certain income level. 
We address several challenges when testing an inverse J-shaped pattern between economic 
development and fertility. One challenge is to properly estimate the minimum level of GDP 
per capita and fertility by a “one step” estimation model. This procedure avoids a division of 
the data set and at the same time enables an empirical estimation of the turning point in the 
relationship between economic development and fertility. Another challenge is to adequately 
control for a series of methodological problems. In comparison to existing empirical studies, 
we  use  a  macroeconomic  panel  data  set  that  includes  a  large  time  dimension.  As  the 
variables vary over the two dimensions of country and time, estimators are more accurate in 
distinguishing variations between countries and over time. In addition, the time dimension of 
the data enables us to control for unobserved country-specific effects and to deal as well as 
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possible with endogeneity caused by an inverse causality between economic development 
and fertility. Furthermore, we distinguish between within- and between-country variations. 
 
Moreover,  we  control  for  birth  postponement  by  using  tempo-adjusted  fertility  rates 
besides total fertility rates as endogenous variable and by using two different measures of 
women’s age at childbirth as control variables. In addition, we test the robustness of our 
findings by controlling for different income distribution patterns as well as for education and 
female employment. In order to gain a deeper insight into the economic mechanisms that 
drive  fertility,  we  finally  decompose  the  GDP  per  capita  into  a  number  of  more  specific 
components, which are labour productivity, working hours and employment, and estimate 
their impact on fertility. Gender-specific variables are taken into account where available. 
 
 
5.1. Econometric strategy 
 
 Based  on  pooled  OLS,  we  first  test  a  linear  against  an  exponential  and  a  quadratic 
model in order to verify whether the impact of GDP per capita on fertility is linear, convex or 
concave and whether there is a maximum or a minimum in the relationship. For the linear 
model, we use total fertility rates (TFR) as endogenous variable and the log of GDP per 
capita (lnGDPpc) as exogenous variable. The exponential model is tested by using the total 
fertility rates (lnTFR) as endogenous variable and GDP per capita (GDPpc) as exogenous 
variable.  To  test  the  quadratic  model,  we  add  the  square  of  the  log  of  GDP  per  capita 
(lnGPDpc²) as exogenous variable to the linear regression model in order to control for an 
inverse J-shaped pattern of fertility along the process of economic development. 
 
Our estimation equation for this quadratic model is: 
 
 
t i t i t i t i GDPpc GDPpc TFR , , 3 , 2 1 , )² ln( ln e b b b + * + * + =      (1) 
   
We use the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (lnGDPpc) which is standard in most 
macro-econometric works, as the logarithmic form reduces absolute increases in the levels 
of GDP per capita and therefore captures proportional rather than absolute differences in the 
distribution of GDP per capita levels. 
 
As lnGDPpc² is a function of lnGDPpc, the coefficients β2 and β3 cannot be interpreted 
separately. To confirm a convex impact on economic development on fertility with a minimum 
point  in  the  pattern  of  fertility  along  the  process  of  economic  development,  β3  must  be 
significantly positive as an indicator of the curve’s convexity. Hence, a positive coefficient 
implies that there is a minimum in the data curve, meaning that an increase of lnGDPpc 
decreases the fertility for small levels of lnGDPpc and increases fertility from a higher level of 
lnGDPpc on.  
 
After confirmation of the quadratic model against the linear and the exponential one, in a 
second  step  we  test  the  robustness  of  the  quadratic  model.  Therefore,  we  use  more 
advanced estimation methods than pooled OLS, as the estimated OLS-coefficients risk being 
biased  and  inconsistent  due  to  omitted  exogenous  variables,  non-stationarity  of  the  time 
series and endogeneity between the endogenous and the exogenous variables.  
 
To control for possible endogeneity, we use an instrumental variables estimator (IV) that 
includes lagged variables of lnGDPpc as instruments for lnGDPpc and lagged variables of 
lnGDPpc² as instruments for lnGDPpc². Instead of simply using lagged exogenous variables 
directly in the estimation equation, we perform the IV-regression in two steps (Two Stage   17 
Least Squares Estimator, see Appendix 2 for mathematical documentation). We use one-
year lags as well as five-year lags. The use of lagged exogenous variables lessens the risk 
of  obtaining  biased  and  inconsistent  estimators  due  to  inverse  causality  between  the 
endogenous and the exogenous variables. For example, it is not possible that TFR observed 
in 1984 impacts lnGDPpc in 1980. On the other hand, it is highly likely that variations of 
fertility that lead back to changes in the economic environment appear time-lagged.  
 
In  order  to  account  for  unmeasured  country-specific  factors,  we  use  a  fixed  effects 
estimation  model  (FE).    The  fixed  effects  model  performs  regression  in  deviations  from 
country means. This implies an elimination of unobserved country-specific variables that are 
constant over time and that have an impact on fertility.  One might, for example, think of the 
country’s degree of national feeling that can be correlated with fertility levels as well as with a 
country’s economic development stage. The fixed effects estimator also captures norms and 
attitudes that  do  not  necessarily  change  much over  time  but  impact fertility,  for  example 
attitudes toward gender roles.  
 
The transformation that produces observations in deviation from individual means also 
implies that the FE estimator focuses on within-country variation only, whereas the OLS and 
IV  capture  variations  between  countries  and  over  time.  To  focus  on  between-country 
variation only, we apply a between effects estimator (BE), which is based on time averages 
of each variable for each country. A comparison of the goodness of fit of the FE and the BE 
estimator tells us whether the estimated impact of economic advancement on fertility are due 
to within- or rather due to between-country variations. 
 
We also compare the fixed effects model to a random effects (RE) model, which captures 
both within and between-country variation. The RE estimator subtracts a fraction of averages 
from  each  corresponding  variable  and  therefore  also  controls  for  unobserved  country 
heterogeneity. If the number of observations is large, the RE model is more efficient than the 
OLS  and  the  FE  model,  but  only  on  the  assumption  that  the  unobserved  effects  are 
uncorrelated with the error term. If this is the case, unobserved country specific variables that 
are  constant  over  time  are  captured  by  an  additional  residual  and  the  estimators  are 
unbiased and asymptotically consistent. We use a Hausman (1978) test to choose between 
the FE and the RE model.  
 
The  models  presented  so  far  do  not  allow  controlling  for  time  specific  effects  and 
endogeneity. This is why we use a first-differences estimator (FDE) in the next step. The 
differencing process eliminates unobserved variables that are constant over time and obtains 
stationary time series. The elimination of time trends is important as the estimation models 
are based on the hypothesis that the time series are stationary. Time series that are marked 
with a trend would lead to spurious regression and thereby to biased estimates. Graphical 
tests (correlogram, partial correlogram), an augmented Dickey Fuller (1979) and a Phillips 
Perron (1988) test for unit root in time series and a Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) test for unit 
root in panel data suggest the existence of an autocorrelation in some of the time series of 
TFR and lnGDPpc (graphs and tests not shown here). As the tests suggest that all series are 
difference  stationary,  the  first-difference  estimator  is  appropriate  to  control  for  non-
stationarity.  
 
The first difference of the natural logarithm of GDP per capita approximates the year-to-
year relative changes of GDP per capita. Hence, the first-difference estimator estimates the 
impact of GDP per capita growth on fertility variations and therefore risks obtaining biased 
estimates due to an "underdevelopment” effect. High GDP per capita growth is likely to go 
hand in hand with low income levels (convergence mechanism) and thereby might be rather 
associated  with  fertility  declines  than  with  fertility  increases.  Thus,  as  the  first  difference 
estimator is not based on level variations, it does not permit clear statements about the role 
of economic development for the fertility rebound in highly developed countries.   18 
Finally, we use a one-step System Generalised Method of Moments estimator, which not 
only  considers  unobserved  heterogeneity  and  non-stationarity,  but at the  same time  also 




Box 1. Generalised Method of Moments applied to the analysis of fertility trends 
 
The  GMM  method  goes  back  to  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991),  who  propose  a  difference  GMM 
estimator that transforms the regressors by first differencing, which removes the fixed country-specific 
effect. Moreover, the use of lagged levels of the regressors as instruments for the first-differenced 
regressors controls for endogeneity. However, lagged levels of the regressors are likely to be poor 
instruments for the first-differences equation. We therefore use an augmented version, which implies 
an efficiency gain over the basic first-difference GMM:  a one-step System GMM estimator that goes 
back  to  Arellano  and  Bover  (1995)  and  Blundell  and  Bond  (1998).  The  System  GMM  estimator 
combines a set of first-differenced equations with equations in levels as a “system”, using different 
instruments for each estimated equation simultaneously. This involves the use of lagged levels of the 
exogenous variables as instruments for the difference equation and the use of lagged first-differences 
of  the  exogenous  variables  as  instruments for  the  levels  equation.  In  addition,  System  GMM  is a 
dynamic panel estimator that makes it possible to control for the dynamics of adjustment by including 
a lagged endogenous variable among the exogenous variables.  
 
However,  even  though  System  GMM  implies  an  efficiency  gain  difference  GMM  by  using 
additional  instruments,  the  System  GMM  does  not  completely  resolve  the  problem  of  weak 
instruments, as not only lagged levels are likely to be poor instruments for differences, but differences 
are also likely to be weak instruments for levels (Roodman 2009; Stock and Yogo 2002). Hence, even 
though the System GMM model proposes the most comprehensive control for a variety of econometric 
pitfalls, it does not offer a complete control for endogeneity.  
 
Moreover, the fact that the System GMM method uses more instruments than the difference GMM 
increases the risk that the estimation model is over-identified (Bowsher 2002;  Roodman 2009). In 
order to reduce the number of instruments, we apply the System GMM estimator to edited data. We 
obtain quinquennial data by dividing the measured time period into five-year sections as follows: we 
use  five-year  means  for  the  observations  of  the  endogenous  variable  and  observations  of  the 
beginning  year  of  the  respective  mean  for  the  exogenous  variables  for  every  country.  This  data 
transformation reduces the number of periods from over 40 to 10 and therefore implies a significant 
reduction in the number of instruments (from over 800 to around 100 depending on the number of 
exogenous variables). Moreover, the transformation of the data into quinquennial data allows us to 
limit time trends, because five-year intervals are less likely to be serially correlated than annual data. 
In  addition,  the  transformed  data  makes  it  possible  to  intensify  the  control  for  endogeneity:  for 
example, if a country’s observation of TFR is the mean of the years 1980-1984, the corresponding 
observation of lnGDPpc is from 1980, which limits capturing impacts of fertility on GDP per capita. 
 
However, the use of around 100 instruments still implies a significant risk of obtaining a severe 
overfitting bias (Bond 2002) and reduces the power of the Sargan test to detect invalid instruments  
(Bowsher 2002). In order to further reduce the number of instruments, we limit the number of lags of 
the instruments for the first difference and for the levels equation instead of using all available moment 
conditions. Moreover, we increase the length of the lag of the instruments. By doing so, we obtain a 
limited number of instruments that does not outnumber the degrees of freedom.  
 
We  report  the  number  of  instruments  and  the  statistics  of  the  Sargan  test  of  over-identifying 
restrictions. The Sargan test tests the validity of the instruments and has a null hypothesis of “the 
instruments  are  exogenous  as  a  group”.  A  p-value  above  0.05  makes  it  possible  to  accept  this 
hypothesis. The Sargan difference statistics validate the extra moment restrictions imposed by the 
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5.2. Estimation results 
 
5.2.1. The impact of GDP per capita on fertility 
 
      Table 1 shows the estimation results for testing a linear against an exponential and a 
quadratic model using pooled OLS. 
 
 




When comparing the linear estimation model in the first column with the exponential 
model in the second column and to the quadratic model in the third column, we observe that 
the goodness of fit is highest for the quadratic model. Even though the significantly negative 
coefficient of lnGDPpc in the first column suggests a dominant negative relationship between 
fertility and economic development, the results suggest that the impact of GDP per capita on 
fertility is not strictly negative and also not only exponential. In fact, the significant coefficient 
of lnGDPpc² indicates that the negative correlation between GDP per capita and fertility turns 
into a positive one from a certain level of economic development on, with a clear minimum 
point in the pattern between the two variables. In the case of an absence of that turning 
point,  the  coefficient  of  lnGDPpc²  would  have  been  non-significant.  Consequently,  we 
conclude that the quadratic model captures the variation between economic development 
and fertility better than the linear and exponential ones. 
 
  Table 2 compares the OLS regression results for the quadratic model with the IV, FE, 
BE,  RE  and  FDE  results,  based  on  the  full  data  set  with  observations  of  all  30  OECD 
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For  all  estimation  methods  except  the  BE  estimation,  the  coefficient  of  lnGDPpc  is 
negative  and  the  coefficient  of  lnGDPpc²  is  positive,  which  confirms  a  convex  impact  of 
economic  development  on  fertility  with  a  clear  shift  in  the  relationship  between  the  two 
variables from negative to positive. 
 
The IV-estimation results are based on five-year lags as instruments for the exogenous 
variables. The estimated coefficients based on one- to four-year lags do not differ much and 
thus are not presented in particular. The fact that the FE regression results are significant 
indicates that the hypothesis of a convex impact of lnGDPpc on TFR can be confirmed also 
for within-country variation only.  This indicates that the convex impact exists not only due to 
cross-country variation, as suggested by Myrskylä et al. (2009) and Furuoka (2009), but also, 
and above all, due to fertility variations that appear within each of the observed countries. 
The goodness of fit of the within variation is –with 54%- higher than the goodness of fit of the 
between variation (33%) and the BE estimation results are hardly significant. Moreover, the 
goodness of fit of the within variation is higher than the overall variation of the OLS and RE 
model. The fact that the FE model is clearly superior to the BE specification indicates that the 
convex  impact  is  actually  dominated  by  within-country  variation.  In  addition,  a  Hausman 
(1978)  test  comparing  the  fixed  effects  to  the  random  effects  model  suggests  that  the 
difference of the estimation results of the fixed and the random effects models is systematic. 
This implies that the hypothesis that the unobserved country effects are not correlated with 
the  error  term  in  the  RE  model  must  be  rejected.  Hence,  for  our  data  the  fixed  effect 
specification  is  superior  to  a  random  effects  specification  in  controlling  for  unobserved 
country-heterogeneity. The fixed effects model controls for country specific variables that do 
not change over time and therefore confirms that the convex impact of lnGDPpc on fertility is 
not driven by unobserved time-constant variables.  
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The last two rows of Table 2 show the calculated minimum levels of GDP per capita and 
TFR  based  on  the  estimated  coefficients
3.  As  the  FE  model  is  proven  to  be  the  most 
appropriate one, fixed-effect estimations are preferred to capture the critical value of GDP 
per  capita  that  induces  an  increase  in  fertility.  Appendix  3  shows  the  calculation  of  the 
minimum levels based on the estimated coefficients of the FE regression.  The FE estimation 
results indicate that the minimum of the curve is located at an income level of $32,600 (PPP) 
and a fertility level of 1.51 children per woman. This suggests that economic development 
decreases fertility until a relatively high income level, but from $32,600 (PPP) on, economic 
growth is associated with a rebound of fertility
4. 
 
To illustrate the pattern between TFR and lnGDPpc, we calculate the TFR for various 
income levels based on the FE regression results and present the results graphically. Figure 
4 overlays our predicted path, as estimated by the FE specification, with the cross-sectional 
variations of the 30 OECD countries in 2006. We expect countries to be located close to the 
predicted line, in the absence of strong country-specific characteristics. 
 
The red line in Figure 4 confirms that the FE regression results imply a reversal of the 
relation between economic development and fertility at a fertility level of 1.51 and an income 
level of lnGDPpc=10.39, which corresponds to $32,600 (PPP). Furthermore, the line shows 
that the estimated pattern between TFR and lnGDPpc is actually inverse J-shaped, i.e. the 
declining branch on the left-hand side is longer than the rising branch at the right-hand side.  
. 
 
Figure 4: FE estimation against actual values of TFR and 
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Source: OECD Data Base (2009) 
 
                                                 
3 As the FE estimation is superior to the BE and RE estimation, we do not calculate the minimum levels for the BE and RE 
estimation results. The minimum levels can also not be calculated for the FDE, as the first-difference estimates are based on 
growth rates instead of levels. 
4 We test this estimated minimum by dividing our data set in two samples, one with GDP per capita levels above and the other 
one with GDP per capita levels below $32,600 (PPP). We find a significantly positive impact of lnGDPpc on TFR for the first and 
a significantly negative impact of lnGDPpc on TFR for the second sample (results not shown here).   22 
 
Figure 4 shows that the fertility and income levels in 2006 correspond quite well to the FE 
estimates for a couple of countries, which are Mexico, Turkey, Canada, Switzerland, Austria 
and  Luxembourg.  For  Mexico  and  Turkey,  our  empirical  analysis  suggests  that  further 
economic growth decreases total fertility rates, whereas for Canada, Switzerland, Austria and 
Luxembourg, one can expect an increase in fertility coming along with a further increase in 
wealth. 
 
Figure 4 also sheds light on countries that significantly deviate from the expected path. 
Some of them, like the Nordic and English-speaking countries, along with the Netherlands 
and Belgium, have much higher fertility levels than their income levels indicate. For some of 
them, especially France and New Zealand, the TFR is much higher than its predicted value 
given their GDP per capita level which is below the estimated threshold (10,39 for lnGDPpc) 
from  which  economic  development  acts  as  a  booster  of  fertility.  It  is  clear  that  in  these 
countries, the fertility “rebound” took place at a time in the process of economic development 
at  which  further  decrease  in  fertility  rates  could  be  expected.  By  contrast,  high  fertility 
countries such as the United States, Iceland, Ireland and Norway are located much more 
clearly on the right-hand side of the predicted curve, which unambiguously predicts a positive 
influence of consumption growth on fertility.  
 
Contrasting  with  this  first  group,  the  countries  below  the  predicted  line  (Eastern  and 
Southern Europe, along with Germany and Japan) have much lower fertility levels than the 
predicted values and the “minimum” set at 1.51. As in Japan and Germany, income levels 
are only somewhat below $32,600 (PPP), our regression results fail to explain why fertility 
levels stay so low especially for these two countries. Their actual level of fertility is all the 
more unexpected since GDP per capita is equal to or higher than its value estimated for 
France or New Zealand. 
 
Strikingly,  the  line  dividing  countries  below  and  above  the  predicted  fertility  level 
corresponds to the distinction between countries providing comparatively high assistance to 
working parents with young children in the mid 2000s, and those characterised by a relatively 
limited  assistance  to  families  and  rather  low  support  for  work  and  family  reconciliation             
(Thévenon 2010). Work and family reconciliation is achieved by different means, however, in 
Nordic  and  English-speaking  countries.  Publicly  regulated  support  is  relatively 
comprehensive in the first set of countries, where generous entitlements to paid leave and 
early enrolment in childcare services combine to support work and child raising in a quite 
continuous way. Alternatively, work and family reconciliation is facilitated by the development 
of part-time work combined with in-cash and in-kind support targeting primarily low-income 
families and preschool children in the English-speaking countries.   
 
We now verify how our FE estimates correspond to the actual trends in fertility rates for 
selected  OECD  countries.  Figure  5  compares  the  FE  estimation  results  with  real  within-
country variations in countries which are close to the estimated path: Austria, Canada and 
Belgium. However, in Belgium, the fertility rebound is more significant than suggested by the 
FE results. In Austria, as in Germany, the impact of immediate further economic growth on 
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Figure 5: Estimated and actual trends in fertility rates 
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Source: OECD Data Base (2009) 
 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the cases of countries which mostly deviate from the expected path 
concerning the level of fertility. However, irrespective of periodical fluctuations, the pattern 
between fertility and income is rather inverse J-shaped in all these countries, which confirms 
that economic growth decreases fertility up to a certain relatively high level of income, and 
then increases it. The fertility rebound coming hand in hand with a certain level of economic 
development is particularly observable in France, the United States and the Czech Republic, 
whereas  in  Germany  and  Portugal,  the  impact  of  immediate  further  economic  growth  on 
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Figure 6: Estimated and actual trends in fertility rates 
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Source: OECD Data Base (2009) 
 
 
As the FE model focuses on within-country variation, it is not surprising that the curve 
based on the FE results corresponds more to variations within countries (Figures 5 and 6) 
than to variations between countries (Figure 4)
5. However, Figures 5 and 6 lead to a common 
conclusion:  in  Eastern  and  Southern  European  countries  and  Germany,  economic 
development goes hand in hand with a lower level of fertility than suggested by our empirical 
results, whereas in countries like France, for example, the regression analysis suggests a 
lower level of fertility given the country’s increase and level of GDP per capita.  It is striking 
that in Figure 6, the German pattern is almost parallel to the French one. This means that in 
these two countries, changes in fertility are almost identically related to changes in income. 
Yet, the German pattern as a whole is situated on a much lower fertility level than the French 
one.  Moreover,  recent  economic  growth  has  induced  a  much  more  significant  fertility 
rebound in France than in Germany. 
 
We conclude that our empirical results so far prove an inverse J-shaped pattern of fertility 
along  the  process  of  economic  development  in  OECD  countries.  Hence,  we  identify 
economic development as a driving factor for the fertility rebound. This implies that further 
economic development is likely to increase fertility in many OECD countries. However, our 
empirical analysis does not succeed in explaining why in some OECD countries, the inverse 
J-shaped pattern is situated at quite different fertility levels. Moreover, we do not know why in 
some countries, economic growth increases fertility again more significantly than in other 
countries.   
 
In countries like France, Belgium and New Zealand, it seems that other factors beyond 
economic  advancement  are  responsible  for  the  relatively  high  fertility  levels  and  the 
significant fertility rebound. Moreover, in Japan, Germany, Austria and Eastern and Southern 
European  countries,  low  fertility  levels  cannot,  or  not  only,  be  explained  by  insufficient 
economic  advancement.  Even  though  our  analysis  suggests  that  in  these  countries  too 
                                                 
5 The line based on the results of the OLS model that captures within- and between-country variation at the same time, is, 
however, very similar to the line based on the FE results shown in Figures 4,5 and 6.    25 
further economic growth increases fertility, it seems likely that fertility increases at a much 
lower level.  
 
We  now  test  whether  the  inverse  J-shaped  pattern  of  fertility  along  the  process  of 
economic development can also be confirmed for the System GMM estimation model, which 
controls for endogeneity, unobserved country-heterogeneity and non-stationarity at the same 
time.  Therefore,  we  use  quinquennial  data,  which  includes  five-year  means  for  the 
observations  of  the  endogenous  variable  and  observations  of  the  beginning  year  of  the 
respective mean for the exogenous variables for every country. Observations from 1960-
2007 are thus divided into ten intervals. We do not only apply System GMM but also re-
estimate the OLS, IV, FE and FDE models based on quinquennial data to test the robustness 
of our findings.  
 




Table  3  shows  that  all  estimation  models  including  System  GMM  confirm  a  convex 
impact of economic development on fertility. The significantly positive coefficient of lnGDPpc² 
of the System GMM estimation suggests that when controlling for dynamics of adjustment, 
for endogeneity, non-stationarity and time-constant omitted variables at the same time, there 
is still an inverse J-shaped pattern of fertility along the process of economic development.  
The  Sargan  test  of  over-identification  restrictions  suggests  that  all  instruments  are  valid 
(exogenous) and the Sargan-Difference test validates the extra moment restrictions of the 
System GMM specification.  
   26 
The  goodness  of  fit  is  again  highest  for  the  FE-model  focusing  on  within-country 
variation. FE regression results based on quinquennial data indicate, at $31,000 (PPP) per 
capita per year, a similar minimum income level to the FE results based on yearly data
6. The 
minimum fertility level is, however, at 1.45, somewhat lower than the one indicated in table 2.  
 
 
5.2.2. Control for birth postponement 
 
It  is  possible  that  in  some  countries,  economic  advancement  has  not  yet  initiated  a 
significant rebound in fertility because in these countries, the postponement of childbearing 
has not yet come to an end. The postponement of births to older ages reduces the number of 
births in a given period and therefore reduces total fertility rates. Several studies suggest that 
an increase in the mean age of mothers at childbirth partially explains the decrease in fertility 
observed  over  recent  decades  in  many  OECD  countries,  and  particularly  the  lowest-low 
fertility  rates  that  can  be  observed  in  many  Eastern  European  countries  (Bongaarts  and 
Feeney 1998; Kohler, Billari and Ortega 2002; Goldstein, Sobotka and Jasilioniene 2009). At 
the same time, the total number of children borne by women over their life course might not 
change, implying that completed cohort fertility does not decrease. In that case, once the 
process of postponement of childbirth has come to an end, total fertility rates are expected to 
increase again. Thereafter, the “catch-up” in the number of births of mothers after age 30 
may partially explain the rebound of fertility in highly developed OECD countries. Bongaarts 
(2001,  2002)  as  well  as  Goldstein,  Sobotka  and  Jasilioniene  (2009)  suggest  that  the 
declining tempo effects, which are due to an end of birth postponement, increase total fertility 
rates particularly in the United States, the Netherlands and Norway. 
 
As the delay in childbirth can be a main determinant of fertility decreases and the end of 
birth postponement a main determinant for a rebound of fertility, we now test whether we still 
find  an  inverse  J-shaped  pattern  between  fertility  and  economic  development  when 
controlling for  tempo  effects.  For  this  purpose, we  use  tempo-adjusted  total fertility  rates 
(adjTFR) as endogenous variable. The tempo-adjusted fertility rate is intended to measure 
fertility levels within a given period in the absence of postponement. Taking tempo changes 
into account, tempo-adjusted fertility rates are usually higher than total fertility rates. Tempo-
adjusted fertility rates are available for 18 OECD countries and cover the years 1961-2005.   
 
The use of tempo-adjusted fertility rates involves a further robustness test, as the adjTFR 
is not available for the outlier countries Luxembourg, Korea, Mexico and Turkey. An inclusion 
of observations from Luxembourg, which has outstanding high levels of GDP per capita and 
at the same time relatively high fertility levels especially in the 2000s, risks over-accentuating 
the  empirical finding  that  economic  development  increases fertility  from  a  certain  income 
level  on.    An  inclusion  of  observations  of  Korea,  Mexico  and  Turkey  also  risks  over-
accentuating  the  inverse  J-shaped  between  fertility  and  economic  development  because 
these countries have outstandingly high fertility levels and at the same time relatively low 
income levels, especially in the 1960s and 1970s.  
 
Data on adjTFR is available as three-year moving averages, which smoothes out short-
term fluctuations.  In order to avoid overlapping information in our data, which would cause a 
problem for the System GMM estimation due to its use of instruments, we do not use five-
year means of adjTFR like we do for the TFR, but observations of every fifth year only as we 
do for lnGDPpc. This reduces our observed time period to the years 1965-2005. 
 
                                                 
6 We do not calculate the minimum levels for the System GMM estimation results, because for this estimation around 66% of the 
variation in total fertility rates is explained by the variation of its own past values.     27 
Table 4 shows the regression results with adjTFR as exogenous variable, based on data 
with five-year observations.  
 
 





For all estimation methods, the coefficient of lnGDPpc² stays positive, though the OLS 
and  IV  results  are  not  significant.  The  estimation  results  in  Table  4  confirm  that  fertility 
increases again from a certain level of development on also when taking into account tempo 
effects. We conclude that changes in the timing of births are not the driving factor behind the 
inverse J-shaped pattern between fertility and economic advancement, as the increase in 
fertility corresponds to real quantum changes. Moreover, we know now that the inverse J-
shaped pattern of fertility along the process of economic development can be confirmed even 
when  omitting  countries  such  as  Luxembourg,  Korea,  Mexico  and  Turkey  that  risk  over-
accentuating the inverse J. Once again, the goodness of the fit is by far higher for the FE –
model than for the other estimation models, indicating that the inverse J-shaped pattern is 
much  more  shaped  by  within  country-variations  than  by  overall-  or  between-country 
variations. 
 
The minimum level of tempo-adjusted fertility indicated by the FE regression is at 1.6 
naturally somewhat higher than our estimated minimum level of total fertility (1.51 and 1.45 
for the FE model in tables 2 and 3), as tempo-adjusted fertility rates are usually higher than 
total fertility rates. However, the estimated minimum income level corresponds approximately 
to those indicated by the FE model in tables 2 and 3.  
 
As tempo-adjusted fertility rates are only available for 18 OECD countries until 2005, we 
apply a further control for birth postponement by keeping TFR as endogenous variable and   28 
by adding the mean age of mothers at childbirth (MAB) as well as the age of mothers at first 
childbirth (MA1B) as control variables to our regression model. These variables exist for a 
larger set of countries and time periods. We use the fixed effects model in order to use data 
with yearly observations up to 2007. The regression results, shown in table in Appendix 4, 
confirm a significantly convex impact of lnGDPpc on fertility when controlling for mothers’ age 
at childbirth and when  covering observations of almost all OECD countries from 1960 to 
2007. However, whether an increase in mothers’ age at childbirth increases or decreases 
fertility depends on the age measure. Due to this ambiguous finding, we prefer to use tempo-
adjusted fertility rates to control for birth postponement.   
 
 
5.2.3. Control for different income distribution patterns 
 
After having tested the robustness of our findings with respect to birth postponement, 
we  now  control  whether  the  inverse  J-shaped  pattern  of  fertility  along  the  process  of 
economic  development  can  be  confirmed  also  when  controlling  for  different  income 
distribution patterns. While fertility trends have proved to depend on the average increase 
GDP per inhabitant, it is also highly likely that this impact can be altered by the fraction of the 
population  who benefit most of this wealth increase. We therefore add, one by one, five 
different measures of income inequalities to our quadratic estimation equation while keeping 
tempo-adjusted  fertility  as  endogenous  variable.  Inequality  indices  are  thus  included  to 
account for changing inequalities at the top of the income distribution (by reference to the 
P90/P50  inter-decile),  around  the  median  (P50/P30)  or  at  the  bottom  (P50/P10).  The 
incidence of low-pay jobs is also considered. Data are available for 15 OECD countries and 
cover the years 1960-2007. We use the fixed-effects model in order to cover observations 
until the year 2007. Table 5 presents the FE estimation results based on yearly observations.  
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Table 5 shows that the fixed-effects estimations confirm an inverse J-shaped pattern 
of tempo-adjusted fertility along the process of economic development even when controlling 
for  income  inequalities.  Furthermore,  for  all  inequality  measures,  the  estimation  results 
suggest that income inequalities are significantly positively correlated with fertility. As the FE 
model focuses on within-country variation, the estimation results imply that when inequalities 
increase in a country, fertility also increases.  The direction of causality is not clear, however, 
since the FE model does not control for endogeneity. The estimated inequality coefficient is 
highest for the P90/P50 measure, which suggests that fertility and inequality increases go 
hand in hand especially in those countries where the upper income decile differs widely from 
the average income level.  
 
However, our estimation results do not show whether there is a polarisation in fertility 
behaviour between upper and lower income deciles. We do not know whether it is rather the 
rich  or  the  poor  households  that  increase  their  number  of  children,  or  whether  fertility 
increases  are  equally  distributed  over  all  income  levels.  More  data  on  the  micro-level  is 
needed to answer this question. Closer analysis of the patterns between income inequalities 
and fertility behaviour is certainly a fruitful area for future research. Knowing if it is the richer 
families that tend to increase fertility (for example because of improved access to private 
services)  or  if  it  is  rather  the  poor  ones  (for  example  because  of  increased  teenage 
pregnancies) makes it possible to derive important policy implications.  
 
The table in Appendix 5 shows some further robustness controls for the FE model based 
on yearly data. The impact of lnGDPpc on tempo-adjusted fertility stays significantly convex 
when controlling for different measures of education and for female employment. However,   30 
data on education is only available for a reduced time period. Only tertiary school enrolment 
turns out to have a significant impact on fertility. The regression results suggest that tertiary 
school enrolment decreases fertility.  
 
 
5.2.4. Decomposition of GDP per capita 
 
Our analysis so far confirms a convex impact of GDP per capita on fertility even when 
controlling for birth postponement and for different income distribution patterns. This implies 
that  economic  development  is  likely  to  induce  a  fertility  rebound  in  OECD  countries. 
However,  we  also  found  that  in  some  OECD  countries,  the  fertility-increasing  effects  of 
economic advancement are likely to be restrained by factors that are not included in our 
estimation model. In order to gain a deeper insight in the economic mechanisms behind 
fertility  increase,  we  now  decompose  GDP  per  capita  into  a  number  of  more  specific 
variables and estimate their impact on fertility.  
 
First, we replace GDP per capita by an interaction term containing three variables, which 
are labour productivity, average working hours per worker and the employment ratio
7.   
 
 
GDPpc= labour productivity * average working hours per worker * employment ratio 
 
 
Figure 5 compares the data plot of TFR vs. GDP per capita against the data plot of TFR 
vs. the interaction term and illustrates that the interaction term adequately substitutes for 
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Interaction 3= labour productivity * average working hours per worker * employment ratio 





                                                 
7 Labour productivity = GDP/ sum of working hours; avrg. working hrs. per worker = sum of working hours / active population;                                            
employment ratio = active population  / total population   31 
Now, we estimate the impacts of each of the decomposition variables on fertility. We use 
adjTFR as endogenous variables to keep the control for tempo-effects. Due to limited data 
availability we reduce our observed time period to the years 1980 to 2005. Including the 
years 1960-1980 in our estimation would seriously bias the results, as for this time period, for 
most of the decomposition variables data is only available for a small sub-group of countries. 
Moreover, the reduction of the database makes it possible to focus on linear impacts of the 
decomposition variables on fertility. In order to focus on determinants of the fertility rebound, 
one could consider further restricting the database, for example to observations from the late 
1990s on. However, we refrain from doing so in order to keep the data set sufficiently large. 
When estimating linear impacts of the decomposition variables on tempo-adjusted fertility, 
we obtain the most robust results by limiting the observed time period to the years 1980 to 
2005.  
 
The first step is to estimate the impact of our three decomposition variables on adjTFR.  
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The  second  step  is  to  split  the  employment  ratio  into  two  variables,  which  are  the 
employment rate (ages 25-54) and the ratio of the active population
8. We limit the observed 
age group in order to better capture the impact of the employment variables on fertility. We 
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The third step is to use our decomposition variables disaggregated by gender and estimate 
our model as follows:  
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Table 6 presents the regression results for estimation equation (2), based on data with 







                                                 
8 Ratio active population = active population (ages 25-54)/ total population (ages 25-54)   32 





We observe that the employment ratio variable has a positive and significant coefficient 
for almost all estimation models, whereas the coefficients of the other exogenous variables 
are not robust or significant.  
 
Whereas the FE model is non-significant, the BE model obtains significant results by 
exploiting differences between countries. As the between estimator discards the time series 
information in the data set, the results suggest that the positive impact of the employment 
ratio on fertility is driven by between-country variation. This is confirmed by the fact that the 
goodness of fit is higher for the BE than for the FE model. 
 
To further test whether employment is a driving factor for the fertility rebound in OECD 
countries, we split the employment ratio into the employment rate (ages 25-54) and the ratio 
of the active population. We then estimate equation (3), again based on data with five-year 
observations from 1980 on.  
 
The regression results, shown in the table in Appendix 6, confirm a significantly positive 
impact  of  employment  on  fertility  for  the  OLS,  BE  and  System  GMM  estimation.  This 
suggests that the higher the employment rate of the population between the age 25 and 54, 
the higher is a country’s tempo-adjusted fertility rate. Moreover, the employment rate is the 
most significant variable in comparison to the other variables, indicating that employment is a 
driving factor for the fertility rebound in OECD countries. Furthermore, the estimation results 
confirm  that  the  correlation  between  employment  and  fertility  is  dominated  by  between-
country variations.   33 
 
As the impact of the decomposition variables on fertility may differ between men and 
women, we now disaggregate working hours, employment rates and the ratio of the active 
population by gender. Table 7 shows the regression results for estimation equation (4), again 
based on data with five-year observations from 1980 on. 
 
 





Table 7 reveals that not only for the OLS, IV and System GMM estimation, but also for 
the between effects estimation, female employment is significantly positively correlated with 
tempo-adjusted  fertility  rates
9.    Hence,  the  overall  estimators  and  the  between  estimator 
                                                 
9  To  further  test  whether  employment  is  a  driving  factor  for  the  fertility  rebound  in  OECD  countries,  we  replace  labour 
productivity by male and female wages for all sectors (results not shown here). Even though this involves a further reduction of 
the number of observations, the estimation results prove the robustness of our finding, as the coefficient of female employment 
stays significantly positive for the OLS, IV and System GMM estimation. However, the wage coefficients are found to be non-
significant.   34 
reveal female employment as the key dimension of GDP that goes hand in hand  with a 
fertility rebound in highly developed countries. This suggests that the change in the impact of 
economic development on fertility from negative to positive in highly developed countries is 
driven by an increase in female labour market participation. 
 
To  date,  high female  employment  rates  (ages  25-54)  over  80%  along  with  high  total 
fertility  rates  and  tempo-adjusted  fertility  rates  can  especially  be  observed  in  Finland, 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland. These are countries with high income levels at the 
same time. Moreover, France for example has higher female employment rates and at the 
same time higher fertility rates than Germany, even though Germany has somewhat higher 
GDP levels. Countries where fertility and female employment rates are particularly low are 
the Southern and Eastern European countries.  
 
Our empirical findings accord with a series of other empirical studies, which investigate 
the  correlation  between  female  employment  and  fertility  in  OECD  countries.  Engelhardt, 
Kögel and Prskawetz (2004a, 2004b), for example, find for six OECD countries, that the 
correlation between female labour market participation and fertility is significantly negative 
only up to the year 1975. Kögel (2004, 2006) finds a positive association between the two 
variables in Western European countries from the 1980s on when focussing on cross-country 
variation. However, the studies highlight that the association between female employment 
and fertility is influenced by the countries’ institutional context, in particular in terms of family 
policies. These components are not explicitly taken into account by our study. They are only 
implicitly considered as governments’ investments are part of GDP per capita 
 
Our finding of a positive correlation between female employment and fertility also implies 
that fertility decreases when female employment decreases. This can be observed in Eastern 
Europe,  where  fertility  rates  declined  sharply  along  with  a  steep  downfall  of  female 
employment in the beginning of the 1990s. Da Rocha and Fuster (2005) confirm our finding 
that fertility is procyclical by emphasising that also in Sweden, East Germany, Spain and 
Italy, during the 1990s both fertility and male and female employment decreased. They find 
that fertility and employment are positively associated in OECD countries with relatively low 
employment ratios.  
 
While fertility recovery goes hand in hand with the increase in female employment rates, 
we find that the impact of male employment is fairly non-significant, which is most likely due 
to the fact that the within and between variations of male employment are fairly negligible in 
our data base. However, estimations reveal that an increase in women’s average working 
hours  has  a  significantly  negative  impact  on  fertility.  Thus,  while  the  increase  in  female 
labour market participation is positive for fertility, working too many hours still curbs fertility 
increase.  Working  more  than  the  current  average  (less  than  40  hours  per  week  in  our 
sample)  is  likely  to  alter  fertility  increase.  By  contrast,  men’s  working  hours  have  a 
significantly positive impact on fertility. These results suggest that fertility still increases in a 
gender-unbalanced context of division of work. The finding of a positive impact of female 
employment  and  a  negative  impact  of  female  working  hours  on  fertility  suggests  that 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This  study  shows  that  the  influence  of  economic  development  on  fertility  trends  has 
changed radically in the last few years, during which a rebound of fertility rates has been 
observed. Our empirical findings support the hypothesis of a convex impact of economic 
advancement  on  fertility  rates. We  find  an  inverse  J-shaped  pattern  of  fertility  along  the 
process of economic development in OECD countries over the decades from 1960 on, which 
is dominated by within-country variation. This implies that in the most developed countries, 
recent economic advancement goes hand in hand with a rebound in fertility. This finding is 
robust when controlling for endogeneity, the postponement of birth and for different income 
distribution patterns. Moreover, whatever the specification is, the estimated threshold from 
which  GDP  per  capital  can  be  expected  to  boost fertility  is  much  higher  than  the  actual 
OECD average in 2007. We therefore expect further economic growth to enhance fertility in a 
large number of OECD countries. 
 
By designating a clear turning point in the relationship between economic development 
and fertility, we find that economic development is a driving factor for fertility in the majority of 
OECD countries and further economic development is likely to induce a fertility rebound. 
However, many countries do not follow the path identified. Some of them demonstrate a 
much lower actual fertility rate in 2006 than the one predicted from GDP trends. Eastern and 
Southern  European  countries  as  well  as  Germany,  Japan  and  Korea  are  clearly  in  that 
situation. At the same time, these countries are characterised by comparatively low support 
for  reconciling  work  with  family  formation,  which  seems  to  restrain  the  fertility-increasing 
effects  of  economic  advancement.  By  contrast,  Northern  European  and  English-speaking 
countries exhibit higher fertility rates than their expected values. These countries provide 
more advanced support for combining work and family, although different in nature. These 
differences throw light on the country-specific factors that lift fertility rates to a significantly 
higher  level,  above  and  beyond  economic  development.  Changes  in  norms  concerning 
childbearing, labour market contexts, and policies supporting families or the work-life balance 
accompanying the process of development are consequently crucial dimensions to consider 
in order to better capture cross-national differences in fertility trends. Moreover, while the 
process of growth is expected to raise fertility from a certain stage of economic development 
on, the increase may be limited for most countries, unless development is accompanied by 
some evolution in the institutional context. Hence, economic advancement seems to be a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for a significant fertility rebound. 
 
To gain a deeper insight in the economic factors that “drive” fertility, we decompose GDP 
per capita into a number of more specific variables and estimate their impact on fertility. 
Here,  we  find  that  fertility  increases  along  with  the  diffusion  of  female  labour  market 
participation. One possible explanation for this finding is that in several highly developed 
OECD  countries,  economic  advancement  not  only  increases  women’s  labour  market 
opportunities, but increases at the same time reconciliation possibilities for parents. Here 
again, the changes in labour market and institutional contexts that accompanied economic 
development are strong candidates for explaining this positive association between fertility 
and female employment trends. Patterns of development vary quite widely across the OECD, 
however. It is clear, for example, that economic development has generated very different 
labour market opportunities for women and various forms of support for combining work and 
family in the Nordic countries, on the one hand, and in the English-speaking countries, on the 
other hand, where fertility and female employment rates are, however, comparatively high. 
Further  investigation  into  the  relationships  between  economic  growth,  labour  market 
development,  policies  regarding  work  and  family  reconciliation  and  fertility  trends  is  now 
required to better understand the variety of cross-national patterns. 
   36 
Finally, our estimation results suggest that economic advancement increases fertility in 
countries that enable female employment, but they do not allow any statements concerning 
the role of public or private reconciliation instruments, as these are only part of our GDP 
measures but are not modelled explicitly in this study. Therefore, further analysis is needed 
to  test  the  positive  association  between  fertility  and  female  employment  by  integrating 
indicators of social policy and particularly the design of reconciliation policies. An in-depth 
analysis of the linkages between fertility, institutional settings like norms and family policies, 
and women’s labour market participation seems to be a fruitful area for future research. In 
addition, we consider a further investigation of the patterns between income inequalities and 
fertility to be worthwhile. 
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Appendix: 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics 
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Appendix 2: IV-regression in two steps (Two-Stage Least Squares) with one-year lags 
 
Step 1:  
Estimation of a reduced form which regresses the endogenous regressor  t i Ppc D G , ˆ ln  over 
the instrument  1 , ln - t i GDPpc : 
 
t i t i t i GDPpc Ppc D G , 1 , 2 1 , ln ˆ ln e b b + + = -  
Calculation of  t i Ppc D G , ˆ ln  based on the estimated coefficients in Step one.  
Calculation of  t i Ppc D G ,
2 ˆ ln  using  t i Ppc D G , ˆ ln .  
 
Step 2: 
Estimation of lnTFR based on  t i Ppc D G ,
2 ˆ ln  and   t i Ppc D G , ˆ ln : 
 
t i t i t i t i Ppc D G Ppc D G TFR , , 3 , 2 1 , )² ˆ ln( ˆ ln ln e b b b + * + * + =  
 
Appendix 3: Quantification of the regression results based on the estimated coefficients of the FE regression 
(Table 2, column 3): 
 










39 , 10 ln 0
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